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Comment: Knowledge Circles and the
Duty of Care
Jill M. Fraley*
There are significant reasons for pursuing solutions that are
flexible and nuanced in the context of second-hand asbestos
exposure. Those reasons center on history and geography—the
history of asbestos manufacture and product use within the
United States and the geography of both asbestos use and
asbestos-related tort claims.
In her Note, Ms. Flinn discusses the development of three
distinct strands of state tort law addressing the potential duty of
care that an employer might owe an employee’s family member
who was exposed to asbestos.1 The three distinct approaches
center around first, foreseeability of the danger and harm;2
second, the relationship between the claimant and the employer;3
and third, the misfeasance or nonfeasance approach, which
focuses on whether the relevant behavior is an act or omission.4
Ms. Flinn addresses advantages and drawbacks of each of these
positions and indicates whether these approaches tend to favor
plaintiffs or defendants in tort litigation.
The Note then turns to evaluating two important recent
developments in the field: the failed history of attempted federal
legislative solutions5 and the novel approach of the Third
Restatement,6 which creates a presumption of a duty where there
* Assistant Professor of Law, Director for the Center of Law and History,
Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See generally Meghan E. Flinn, Note, A Continuing War with Asbestos:
The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV 707 (2014).
2. Id. at 714–19.
3. Id. at 719–24.
4. Id. at 724–28.
5. See id. at 751–53 (discussing Congress’s attempts to initiate asbestos
litigation).
6. Id. at 728–30.
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is a risk of physical harm, but allows that presumption to be
outweighed by articulated policy considerations.7 Ultimately Ms.
Flinn rejects both pursuing federal legislative solutions and the
approach of the Third Restatement.8 She encourages a “multifactored test” approach that would consider each of the tort
factors traditionally relevant to an analysis of duty—including
both the foreseeability of the harm and the relationship between
the parties—while also incorporating the Restatement’s public
policy approach to duty.9
Significantly, the Note recognizes that state tort law
diverges when weighting these and other factors in the duty
analysis, with some states relying heavily on foreseeability and
others weighting the factors more evenly.10 Ms. Flinn encourages
states to continue to use each of the factors, weighting them
according to their own historical practice.11 Additionally, she
argues that the state legislatures rather than the federal should
take on the task of considering appropriate legislation that would
weight policy considerations raised by second-hand exposure
cases.12
In this Comment, I want to take the opportunity to explain
some additional support for the Note’s approach, which rejects
what many have sought in terms of national consistency within
this line of cases. My observations on these topics come from
direct experience—through a few years of litigating products
liability claims that included not only premises-based asbestos
exposure claims but also second-hand exposure cases. In
litigating those cases, I applied my training as a legal historian to
the review of hundreds of boxes of client documents dating to the
early half of the twentieth century along with summaries of
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010)
(making an exception to the duty of reasonable care only where an “articulated
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability”).
8. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 745 (rejecting the Third Restatement and
proposing other solutions).
9. Id. at 746–51.
10. See id. at 745 (recognizing the different ways that state courts weigh
the various factors relevant to take-home asbestos cases).
11. See id. at 750 (“[T]he multi-factored test gives each court the flexibility
to implement its state’s common law on torts and to adhere to its precedent.”).
12. See id. at 755 (asserting that “individual state statutory responses most
effectively address the problem of take-home asbestos exposure”).
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research from numerous other cases and industries. In the
following, I offer a few reflections about the complexity of the
historical story, based on my own exposure to pending cases.
As the Note explains, one of the differences between the
Third Restatement’s approach and the foreseeability approach is
that the former makes duty a question of law, while the latter
approaches duty through a question of fact.13 The foreseeability
approach, which is arguably also inherent in many policy
considerations for second-hand asbestos exposure claims,14
immediately generates historical questions. Who knew that
asbestos was lethal enough to cause harm to an employee’s family
members when carried home on clothing? When was that
knowledge common or expected?
Unfortunately, in seeking simple, comprehensive, and
national answers to those questions, courts often speak of the
knowledge of “the asbestos industry,”15 a phrase too historically
broad to generate very accurate conclusions. As a naturally
occurring mineral substance with extraordinary physical
properties in terms of thermal capacities and the manipulability
of mineral fibers that rivaled fabrics, asbestos permeated
industrial work within the United States for decades.16 Asbestos
use spanned major industries beginning with the mining industry
responsible for obtaining raw asbestos, and then including the
production of building materials as diverse as shingles, siding,
flooring, wiring, heating systems, and insulation, but also other
major American industries including the manufacture of
electronics from radios to household irons, automobile production,
and numerous national-defense-related industries.17
13. See id. at 731–32 (explaining the Third Restatement’s position).
14. See id. at 737–38 (proposing a link between foreseeability and public
policy).
15. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th
Cir. 2009) (“There has been no showing of any general knowledge of bystander
exposure in the industry. Indeed, other courts have found there was no
knowledge of bystander exposure in the asbestos industry in the 1950’s.”).
16. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 1,
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited
Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the nature and use of asbestos) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See id. (discussing the use of asbestos in the United States and those
industries that pose a high risk for asbestos exposure).
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It is nearly impossible to make a coherent and accurate
statement about the state of knowledge of asbestos toxicity within
“the asbestos industry” because asbestos was a part of so many
diverse industries that would have had differing rates of
asbestos-related illnesses depending on the rate and method of
exposures. Automobile brake linings, for instance, contained
comparatively far less asbestos than insulation products.18 In
short, there is every reason to expect that knowledge of asbestos
toxicity—and particularly the toxicity of attenuated second-hand
exposure—was uneven both geographically and temporally.
While some information may be inferred from the publication
of peer-reviewed studies in national journals,19 for decades
experts continued to disagree about facts that were important to
understanding causation.20 Many plaintiffs alleged exposure
through multiple employments in multiple industries, thereby
making it even more difficult for medical experts to pinpoint
toxicity levels.21 Notably, one of the reasons the lethal toxicity of
asbestos remained poorly understood for some time was the
comparatively long latency period that exists for mesothelioma,
which often develops fifteen to twenty-five years after exposure,
but then becomes nearly immediately fatal.22 Most importantly,
experts disagreed significantly about the level of exposure that
was necessary to put a person at risk23—an issue that would be
particularly relevant to determining whether an individual
18. See id. (explaining asbestos levels of exposure in various industries).
19. See, e.g., Ellen P. Donovan et al., Evaluation of Take Home (ParaOccupational) Exposure to Asbestos and Disease: A Review of the Literature, in
42 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN TOXICOLOGY 703, 703–31 (Roger McClellan ed., 2012)
(describing how and when the risks of take-home asbestos came to be
understood).
20. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 743 n.226 (explaining that experts have
fundamental disagreements about the evolution of the asbestos crisis).
21. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 442 (6th
Cir. 2009) (explaining that the plaintiff brought suits against General Motors
and Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. because her husband came into contact with
asbestos while he worked for each of the companies). The plaintiff alleged that
her husband’s exposure at either job could have caused her asbestos-related
illness. Id.
22. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATION OF ASBESTOS-RELATED DISEASES
1 (2006) (explaining the latent effects of asbestos exposure).
23. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 16 (discussing
whether a “safe” level of asbestos exists).
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corporation knew or should have known that any harm was likely
to befall the family of an employee based solely on brief exposure
to the employee’s clothing.
None of this is said to defend the corporations, some of whom
seem to have knowingly caused harm to the American public as
well as their own employees. The point, rather, is to acknowledge
that determining foreseeability for any individual corporation is a
complex historical question.
Moreover, it is also a geographical question. Knowledge of
asbestos toxicity not only spread more quickly through some
industries than others, but it spread geographically throughout
the country unevenly depending on the saturation of asbestosusing industries and asbestos-containing products.24 As a broad
generalization, because of its insulation properties, asbestos use
was more common within New England than in the South, which
faces fewer negative temperatures. As a result, in a time long
before electronic communication, a company in Delaware or
Pennsylvania had a greater likelihood of encountering expert
knowledge on the toxicity level of asbestos than a company in
Florida. Knowledge bases about toxicity are likely to parallel the
geographical distribution of manufacture and production, as well
as product distribution.
Similarly, because there is a geography to the history of
asbestos mining and industrial use, there is also a geography to
the resulting tort litigation. As the Note explains, some courts are
greatly burdened by asbestos-related claims, while others only
rarely encounter them.25
Returning to the issue of foreseeability, I would postulate
that the concept is so significant for many states in determining
whether there is a duty—and also so often pulled into policy
discussions—because foreseeability is inherently tied to our sense
of fairness. We want to hold liable those companies that knew
and did nothing to protect citizens (whether employees or not)
24. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT 159 fig.7-2
(2003) (illustrating the dispersion of mesothelioma cases throughout the United
States and demonstrating that the northern states have the highest mortality
rate).
25. See Flinn, supra note 1, at 755 (discussing the differing concentrations
of asbestos litigation throughout the nation).
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who did not know of the danger. I would further argue that if we
want to approach foreseeability in secondhand asbestos litigation
fairly, then we need to do so in the way that Ms. Flinn has argued
within this Note—through flexible mechanisms that maintain
state autonomy and continue to emphasize foreseeability as a key
factor in determining whether there is a duty of care.26 Similarly,
state legislatures are better positioned than the federal
government to craft statutory responses that will be narrowly
tied to the industrial history of each area of the country.27 In
some states, the prevalence of certain industries or milestone
publications on toxicity may well be sufficient to make desirable a
statute that would postulate a certain level of foreseeability,
thereby replacing fact-intensive judicial proceedings.28
A quest for national uniformity or comprehensiveness in an
approach to addressing second-hand asbestos claims would
necessarily rely on generalities that would subsume the historical
and geographical nuances of both industries and knowledge
transfer. A more flexible approach, and one that seeks state
legislative solutions, better fits the history and geography of the
social problem at hand.

26. See id. at 750 (suggesting a flexible approach to take-home asbestos
litigation).
27. See id. at 755–56 (encouraging state legislatures to draft litigation that
corresponds with the state’s history with asbestos).
28. See id. at 754 (mentioning Ohio’s ban on take-home asbestos claims as
a possible statutory approach).

